Project Appraisal and Foreign Exchange Constraints: A Simple Exposition by Charles R. Blitzer et al.







Working Paper No. 2165




The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in Taxation. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and
not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #2165
February 1987
Project Appraisal and Foreign Exchange Constraints:
A Simple Exposition
ABSTRACT
In an earlier paper,' we showed that the value of shadow
prices depends onhow thegovernmentcontemplates re-
equilibrating the economy to the perturbation associated with any
project, exceptin the extreme case where the government has
chosen all policy instruments optimally. Only under restrictive
conditions will relative shadow prices for traded goods equal
relative international prices. We develop here a general
methodology for calculating shadow prices, which expresses the
prices as a weighted average of domestic and international
prices. The formulae provide the conditions under which the
border price rule is valid. For instance, so long as there are
non—traded goods, even if the government leaves tariffs unchanged
(so thatrelative domestic prices of traded goods remain
unchanged), unless the government completely neutralizes the
induced change in domestic income, there will be changes in the
prices of non—traded goods. These will preclude the use of the
border price rule.
1C.Blitzer, P. Dasgupta and J.E.Stiglitz (1981),
"Project Appraisal and Foreign Exchange Constraints," Economic
Journal,Vol.91, pp. 58—74.
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In our earlier paper, we raised three points:
(1) In general, any project hasconsequencesfor dosestic incose,
governeent revenue, and foreign exchange. Depending on which constraints are
binding, the governient will have to adjust taxes, subsidies, expenditures,
and foreign borrowing whenever new projects are undertaken.
(2) The calculation of shadow prices depends on how thegoverna.nt
contesplat.. re-equilibrating the econosy to theseperturbationsinduced by
the the project, except in theth.rather •xtress case where the governeent
has chosen all policyinstrusentsoptically, in which casethewelfare
consequencesofall forss of adjustaent are identical.
(3) Only under certain restrictive conditions would relative shadow
prices for traded goodsequalrelative international prices.
Thegeneralvalidity of these propositions is, by now, wellestablished.
In spite of this, the "border price" rule (that shadow prices are
proporionel to border or world prices) continues to enjoy considerable
1 Financial support froc the National Sciencs Foundation and the HIT Center
for Energy Policy Research is gratefully acknowledged.-2-
popularity, partly because of the seemingly convenient simplification it
provides for calculation purposes, and partly because of its political
overtones, suggesting limited government interference in the market. If
correct, our results have an important practical implication--namely, that the
"border price" rule is applied too broadly, and should not be used unless the
country in question actually follows one of a limited set of policies for
which it is valid. We, therefore, welcome this opportunity to clarify our
results and further explain their application.
Given the range of possible equilibrating mechanisms, the delineation of
all circumstances under which shadow prices are proportional to international
prices and the derivation of shadow price formulas when they are not equal to
international prices is a complex matter beyond the scope of our original
paper, the objective of which was to develop a general framework into which
such problems should be cast. The authors of recent comments on our paper2
argue that shadow prices may indeed be equal or proportional to international
prices udder somewhat more general conditions than a casual reading of our
earlier paper would suggest. Rather than debating the questions of which set
of assumptions is more appropriate or assessing the consequences of any
technical errors in the Dinwiddy-Teal piece, we believe it would be more
useful to recast the problem in general terms to see what is at issue.
A GENERAL FORMULATION
We suppos. that the economy in question is initially (i.e., before the
project) in some equilibrium. This equilibrium may or may not imply trade
2 Caroline Dinwiddy and Francis Teal. "Project Appraisal and Foreign Exchange
Constraints: A Comment,' and Edward Tower and Peter G. Werr, "On the
Proportionality between World Prices and Shadow Prices Under Alternative
Equilibrating Mechanisms. --3-
balance, a public deficit, or distortionary indirect taxes on trade,
production, and consumption. The nature of the initial equilibrium by itself
is not of importance for shadow price derivation, which depends only how a
particular project effects the change in the equilibrium position.
To further simplify the analysis, we assume: a) the level of the
country's foreign trade activities do not affect the terms of trade it feces
(the small country assumption); and b) there are no quote restrictions on
consumption .3
A "project' is defined as any small change in the composition of
national production. We shall use the superscript T" to denote traded
commodities and the superscript "N" to denote non-traded commodities.
denotes the set of traded commodities,7) the set on non-traded commodities,
and5 the set of all goods. CT denotes aggregate spending on traded goods
measured at world prices,
cT=EpCTiE
Denote by Xj the output of the i'th commodity. We can represent a pro3ect as
a vector,4
dX =(dXi)
Th. analytical problem is to determine the effect of the project on
national welfare once a new equilibrium is restored. We decompose the impact
on national welfare of the pro3ect into two elements: a) changes in th. level
of (current) utility of the representative consumer, and b) the present value
3 See our previous paper for a discussion of the relation between shadow
prices and quota restrictions.
4 A. usual, negative elements in the vector would represent inputs.-4-
of net changes in the trade surplus/deficit. The former measures the
contemporary benefits of additional domestic spending, while changes in the
foreign exchange balance imply future benefits and costs.5 Letting dW, dU,
and dF stand for changes in welfare, consumer utility, and the trade surplus
respectively, we have:
dW =dU (1)
where ? is the relative value of a unit increase in the trade surplus to a
unit increase in present utility.6
Our objective now is to relate dU and dF to changes in consumption
levels, or alternatively to changes in domestic income and prices; and to
relate these changes to the underlying perturbation (dx). Current utility is
just a function of the current levels of consumption. Letting C1 denote the
consumption of the i'th commodity,
dU =1(U/C ] dC (2)
iEJ
i
Since the marginal utility of the i'th good is dust equal to th. price of the
good times the marginal utility of income, we have (after normalizing the
marginal utility of income at unity):
dU q dC (3)
iE
where is the consumers' price of good 1.
5 We simplify our analysis by assuming the consumers do not save; thus, the
direct effect of an increase in their current income is only an increase in
current consumption. This also consistent with optimal investment/savings
behavior by consumers, but not necessarily by the government at the same
time.
6 Our 1981 paper discusses the derivation of ?.whichin general requires use
of dynamic modeling.-5-
It is often convenient to represent the current utility by the indirect
utility function, giving utility as a function of consuier prices. q, and
dopestic income net of taxes and subsidies, 'fd•
U =V(q;Yd) (4)
Differentiating, we obtain
dU = (aVIdq)dq(V/Yd] dY'
i E









isthe sarginal utility of income, which it will be recellsd we normalize to
unity.
Th. chang. in the trade surplus, dF, can also be decomposed into two
components: a) the direct foreign exchange value of the goods produced by the
pro)ect. which wedenote bydYw. and b) th. indirect foreign exchange cost of
changes in imports of consumption goods brought aboutbyany domestic spending




where the p-vector represents international prices.-6-
Letting consuiption of the i'th good be a function of consuier prices,
q, end domestic income (net of taxes/subsidies) yd:
C, =C,(q,Y) (7)
and taking the total derivative of (7), we have
dC. =(C./Yd]dYd I (C./E4q )dq (8)
1 1 icb
1
Using(8), we can derive dCT es a function of dYd and dq. That is,




where the index i covers only traded goods and the index jincludesnon-traded
goods as well. This can be further siaplified to








Here, 0 is the Marginal propensity to iMportand0q3/C istheelasticity of
isports with respect to the j'th price, both Measured at international prices.
SubstItuting (9') into (6) and (5'), while setting V1 at unity, and then
substituting into (1), we obtain the following expression for the change in
national welfare as a function of the direct foreign exchange earnings of the
project, the net change in dosestic conauser spending, and the change in
conauaer prices brought about by the project:
dWdYd -Cdq +2(dYW-9dYd -0dq) (10)-7-
where we employed the standard vector notation C.dq =EC.dq.. This equation
takes account of the value of the project in international and domestic prices
(through dYW and dYd respectively), price and indirect tax changes (through
dq), and changes in direct taxes and subsidies (through dYd).
We define the relative shadow price of any two goods i and j by
s/s =(dW/dX]/tdW/dX ] (11)
1) i j
where the total derivatives take into account the full equilibrium adjustment
to the project-induced perturbation.
The rest of the general analysis consists of calculations of the values
for dq and dyd associated with any project (dXi). where the calculations must
be done subject to any constraints imposed and the marginal public finance
behavior of the government. These are then introduced into (10) and (11) to
derive shadow prices. We proceed to demonstrate how this can be done for
several specific situations.
CONSUMPTION OF TRADED GOODS ONLY
We first consider cases where there is no consumption of non-traded
goods. While admittedly of limited interest, these cases are useful as the
most straightforward illustration of our approach and our conclusion that the
border price rule holds only in special circumstances. We begin with the
simplest casesinwhich the government takes no action to adjustment domestic
prices to the perturbations caused by a project, using only direct taxes and
subsidies. We then consider cases where prices as well as direct taxes are
adjusted to restore equilibrium.
In cases where the equilibrium entails constant domestic prices,
complete results are obtained easily. Here, (10) reduces to:
dW dYd MdYW -0dyd) (12)-8-
It is thus immediate that if the government acts to sterilize completely
domestic expenditures from the project (so, dYd 0). then dW is proportional
to the direct foreign exchange earnings of the project (dYW), so that the
border price rule holds. This is the same as saying that the government
shifts its portfolio from a traded commodity to foreign exchange. Setting
dYd =0implies 100k taxation of the domestic value of the project with no
accompanying lump-sum payments of these receipts.
If the government makes compensating adjustments (of y kind) to
maintain the trade balance at its previous level, then the change in domestic
expenditure, dyd, must be exactly equal to iie times the change in foreign
exchange directly due to the project, dYw. Hence,
dW= dYW/8
Again,the border price rule holds.
More generally, whenever the government imposes a 100 percent tax on
domestic income from the project and then allows domestic expenditure to
increase by some fixed fraction of the project's foreign exchange earnings,
relative shadow prices will equal relative border prices. These case are
those where:
dYd =,dYW
The first two cases above correspond to i0 and v1/e respectively.7 These
results in turn are special cases of the still more general result that when
all relevant total perturbations are simply proportional to dYW, shadow prices
are also proportional to dYw.
7 An alternative interpretation of this condition is that public sector firms
are required to keep their books in terms of border prices and the tax rate
on such profits is set equal to 1-u.-9-
Now consider the case where the change in domestic expenditure, dYd, is
a function of the project itself and there is no net direct taxation. Here,
dYd E q1 dX1
(13)
i El..
Ifthe economy is indifferent to accumulating one more unit of foreign
exchange or incurring the foreign exchange coats of increasing domestic
consumption by one unit, then this implies=lie,a situation which we
referred in our previous paper as one of optimal borrowing. Clearly, (12)
implies that in this situation, the border price rule is correct.
Finally, it is trivial to see that if relative domestic prices of the
traded goods are the same as their relative border prices, then the relative
shadow prices will also be in this ratio.
We have thus identified five circumstances where the border price rule
will hold when domestic prices do not change and there are no non-traded
consumption goods:
U) When the government equilibrates to leave domestic expenditure
after the project unchanged (complete sterilization of domestic
expenditure);
(2) When the government equilibrates to leave a fixed trade balance
after the project;
(3) When the level of foreign borrowing is set optimally before the
project (? =1/8);
(4) When the government uses direct taxation and lump-sum subsidies to
increase domestic expenditures in proportion to the direct foreign
exchange earnings of the project;
(5) When there isanon-distortionary trads regime (domestic prices
proportional to international prices).
In all other cases, theborderprice rule cannot be directly applied.





Here, the shadow prices are weighted averages of domestic and international
prices.8
Consumption Taxes
It is more difficult to get the border price rule to work when
ad)ustments are made in consumption taxes. We will not develop a general rule
of when border pricing is incorrect, but instead only consider several simple
examples.
It can be demonstrated straightforwardly that if the government changes
all commodity prices in proportion, while using direct taxes to hold dYd equal
to zero, then (10) will reduce to a form essentially identical to (12) because
the commodity taxation will act identically to an income tax. In this
situation all of the previous results will continue to hold, with the change
in the price level playing the same role as changes in income did previously.
Of greater interest are cases when only one consumption tax, e.g., that
on good 1. is altered and no lump sum transfers/taxes are imposed, so that the
change in domestic income equals the value of the pro)ect in domestic prices.




If the change in the tax on good 1 is just sufficient so that dF =9the





8 Shadow prices are a positive weighted average (i.e., a > 0) provided that
ie < 1.
9 Here, dq1 =(dYW-edyd)/01.—11—
It is clear that the welfare change in (14') will be proportional to the
project's border price value only if the total indirect tax rate on each good
is the sane for all goods, a special case of which is zero indirect taxes.
Under these circumstances dyd would be proportional to dYW because the
coefficient of dYd becomes zero. Letting (1 +r)equal the common ratio of
domestic to world prices, this result follows from the basic properties of the
demand functions themselves. Engel aggregation implies that e1+tand
Cournot aggregation implies that -Cj(1 +t).Otherwise, the border
prices rule will fail. The sane conclusions hold if the consumption tax on
good 1 is altered so astokeep contemporaneous utility constant, dU 0,
allowing all benefits to derive through dF.1°
Tb. general conclusion is that the "border price" rule fails unless the
various public finance instruments are set according some first- or second-
best rules derived from the solutionof en optimizing problem. When taxes are
setinamore fashion, the "border price" rule cannot be expected to
hold.
INCLUSIONOF NOW-TRADED GOODS
Thesore interesting and relevant cases are thos. where consumption of
non-traded goods must alsobeconsidered. Th. involve additional constraints
on the actions ofthegovernment which must account for the market equilibrium
conditionsthat for each non-traded good
(15)
If the pro)ect leavesoutputof any non-traded good, e.g.,goad ,unchanged
then (8) and (15) imply




Equations (16) ispose a set of restrictions on the feasible set of actions
which the governeent can take, above and beyond those in the previous cases.11
The aisplest case is when all dosestic prices. q, are left unchanged.
This isplies that dYd suet also equal zero and fros (11) that the border price
rule will hold. This is the ease as case (1) above where, because of cosplete
sterilization, the entire effect of the pro)ect is on foreign borrowing.
Interesting results only eserge when one or sore dosestic prices are
allowed to change when a new pro3ect perturbe a pre-existing equilibrius.
Each set of feasible adjustsent rules would require a separate set of shadow
price calculations. Here, we consider only a few specific cases.
For instance, suppose that in response to a perturbation, the governeent
allows the exchange rate facing consuners to ad)uat, which changes the
relative prices of traded and non-traded goods, but leaves the relative prices
of traded goods as before. We further sisplify by considering only one non-
traded good, C. Taking this good as the nuneraire, we can denote the change
in the exchange rate as dE. This isplies
dq =qdE
(17)
Equations (16) and (17) laply that
o cN,aydyd•E (18)
11 That is. the nunber of connodity taxes and direct taxes/subsidies which can
be set independently is reduced by the nusber of non-traded goods. For
non-traded consodities whose output changes due to a pro)ect, the left-hand
side of (16) is not zero but the change in output of that non-traded good.-13-
and
dE - Eq1(CN/q]) dyd (18')
iE
where the index i covers all the traded goods. Substituting the value for dE
fros (18') into (10) yields'2
dW/adYd • - 6 dYd) (19)
where





=?( q(aC'/q3/(EqtaC/q3 (ac/ayd)E Cqj]
ê= e-(ac/YduE q(a /q)) iEiE
Using Euler's Theoree and definingr,and as the expenditure share
and the incose and own-price elasticities of good i. the paraseters a,






12 Equation (18') can alsobs writtenin terasof desand elasticities. Using
Euler'sTh.oree dE would equal th. percentage chang. in dosestic
.xp.nditure.dYd.tie.. theratio ofthe incoaeelasticity of th.thenon-
tradedgooddividedby the sue oftheincose and own-price elasticitiesof
thenon-traded good. The elasticityfore will often b. sore convenientin
.apiricsl applications.-14-
Since (19) has the same form as (12), relating the change in welfare to the
change in domestic expenditures and the direct foreign exchange earnings of
the project, the same qualitative analysis can be applied. The only
difference is that with the inclusion of the non—traded good, en equilibrating
change in the consumers exchange rate is made. This change is incorporated in
the "hats" used in (19).13 Therefore, when the the only price changes are due
to exchange rate changes, the border price rule will be correct:
(1) When the government equilibrates to leave domestic expenditure
after the project unchanged (co.plete sterilization" of domestic
expenditure);
(2) When the government equilibrates to leave a fixed trade balance
after the project;
(3) When the level of foreign borrowing is set optimally before the
project ( 1/);
(4) When the government uses direct taxation and lump-sum subsidies to
increase domestic expenditures in proportion to the direct foreign
exchange earnings of the project;
(5) When there is a non-distortionary trade regime (domestic prices
proportional to international prices).
For any other taxation rules with exchange rate adjustment, relative shadow
prices do not equal relative international prices.14 The general shadow price
formula will be the same as (11'). but with the weight a now b.ing
(1 -)/(1 -+$)
Not.that as becomessmell, the shadow price ratio approaches the domestic
price ratio.
13 This analysis, of course, requires that s not equaltozero. This will be
the case as long as the
14 It is easy to show that this analysis is unchanged for any price adjustment
rule in which there is a one-to-on. relationship between the consumer price
changes end the change in expenditure.-15-
Alternatively, suppose that the adjustments to price and domestic
expenditures are arbitrarily proportional. to the induced disequilibrium in the
foreign exchange market. In this case, the border price rule will be correct.





The choice of k must be consistent with equation (16), so that
0 dF((CN/Yd]k E IaCM/aq 3k ) (21)
iE
Substituting (21) into (5)' (with VI =1), we sse that the chang. in
contemporaneous utility will be proportional to dF. Naking th. same
substitution into (9) and then (6') shows that dF will be proportional to dYW,
thus proving that dW will be proportional to the project's direct foreign
exchange earnings and supporting the border price rule. The result stems from
government behavior which uses lump sum taxes/subsidies (kr) to equilibrate
in a way so that everything is proportional to the direct foreign exchange
earnings of the project.
Obviously, there are many other behavioral rules which a government
could usetore-equilibrate an economy. Each would require explicit
calculation of the project-induced changes in prices and domestic expenditures
and then measured using (10). It should be clear, however, that ther. is no
presumption that the results will be shadow prices which correspond with
international prices, except in special circumstances.-16-
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We have demonstrated that it is appropriate to use relative border
prices as the relative shadow prices for traded good only in special
situations where the government. The underlying reason for this conclusion is
that generally investment pro)ects affect budget constraints in domestic
prices and changes in these budget constraints lead to spending changes.
These leakages, in turn, can affect both contemporaneous utility and the
future utility (via the foreign exchange balance) in ways such that knowing
only the direct foreign exchange values of two pro)ects is not sufficient to
determine their ranking in terms of social welfare, or even to determine if a
pro)ect with positive foreign exchange earnings will have positive net social
value.
Moreover, so long as there are non-traded goods, even if the government
leaves tariffs unchanged (so that relative domestic prices of traded goods
remain unchanged), unless th. government completely neutralizes th. induced
change in domestic income, there wi]]. be changes in the pric. of non-traded
goods.15 Th. magnitudes of these price changes, and the consequent w.lfare
effects, depend on all price and income elasticities.
Thus, although the border price rule will not, in g.n.xal, be valid, we
have developed a framework which allows shadow prices to be calculated. These
calculations will in gensral necessitate knowledge of income andprice
elasticities, as well, as of the r.lativs values of contemporaneous utility and
future utility in th. form of current foreign exchange holding.. Fortunately
for th. practitioner this should not usually require additional estimations
since these are precisely the parameters which ordinarily are used to
It should be noted that the price of non-traded goods, relative to traded
goods, can be viewed as th. reel exchange rate.-17-
calculate shadow prices for non-traded goods and factors. Our results serely
isply that this inforsation be used also in the calculation of the shadow
prices for traded goods.
It would be convenient for econosic theorists if we could prasuse that
governeents set all of their policies optically, in tercs of a well defined
social welfare function. It is apparent, however, that all too often we
observe policies that sees inconsistent with any reasonable" social welfare
function, and indeed, with each other. This say be because we (the econosic
analysts) have badly us-specified the sodel of the econosy, and in
particular, the constraints facing the governsent. But it say also be because
there is no reason to believe the outcoses of the political/adsinistrative
processes should accord with a well defined social welfare function.
In these circucetancea, what should be the nature of the advice given by
econocists? It is apparent that that advice predicated on the presuaption
that all other governeent actions are optically set, to saxisize a well
defined social welfare function, is not only based on an incorrect description
of the econosy, but also, were it taken seriously, sight have significant
adverse effects. There is a fashion esong sos• econosists to build into their
welfare analyses certain "political constraints"; but econosists sees to have
no particular ecusen in ascertaining what are and are not political
constraints. The best that econosists can do is describe how governeents have
in fact b.haved in the past--how they have equilibrated th. econosy to various
kinds of suall p.rturbations including those pro).ct-r.let.d--and to describe
the cons.quenc..--hsre, th. shadow price isplications--of alternative ways in
which the econocy sight be equilibrated. We hope that our paper has clarified
how this say be dons.-18-
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